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Barone, Jr.: The Destruction of American Liberties

DELEGATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN LIBERTIES:
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE CONTRACEPTION
MANDATE
Michael Barone, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”1 This conviction, penned by James Madison under the pseudonym of Publius,
served to remind the delegates of the Constitutional Convention of
the dangers that could arise from the government that was being created.2 Among the numerous principles espoused by Madison, John
Jay, and Alexander Hamilton in their pro-Federalist pamphlets, the
theory of separation of powers in government was often alluded to as
a necessary principle that would help preserve the freedom and liberty secured by the Revolution. Yet today, more than two centuries after these statesmen penned such ardent support for the document that
is the foundation of American government, there still exists disagreement over the proper role and reach of the three branches,3 as
*

J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011 in Political Science, College of the Holy Cross. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Schweitzer
for taking the time to discuss with me the finer aspects of religious freedom and the First
Amendment and advice on the direction of this paper; Jonathan Vecchi and Meaghan Howard for their guidance, editing, and support; to my parents for providing me the opportunity
to learn; and my family and friends for listening to me drone on about free exercise and delegation for a year. In particular, I would like to extend extra thanks and appreciation to my
parents for their continued support and for making my pursuit of higher education possible.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2
Id.
3
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (regarding the constitutionality of the legislative veto in regard to regulation creation by agencies); see also Clinton v. City of New York,
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well as concern for the fate of certain liberties4 that Madison cared to
keep from beneath the heel of tyrants.
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”)5 in an attempt to make health care more affordable and easier to obtain for the majority of Americans without
insurance.6 With such a monumental law, totaling over 900 pages,
came the creation and addition of numerous regulatory policies, 7 as
well as several constitutional challenges to Congress’s authority to
enact certain aspects of such a legislative behemoth, most notably in
the recently decided National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius.8 Accompanying such sweeping legislation was the concern
regarding the role of the federal government in the market, the home,
the workplace, and even in religion.
Part II of this Comment will address the effect of certain aspects of the PPACA on regulation, as well as the creation and substance of Title 45, Section 147.130 of the Code of Federal Regulations regarding coverage of preventative services.9 Part III will
examine the history of Congressional delegation to the Executive
branch throughout the twentieth century, as well as the history of the
First Amendment and the evolution of free exercise claims throughout that period. The various tests established during the last century
will be discussed for both topics. Part IV will discuss current jurisprudence in the realm of delegation and free exercise claims. Part V
will criticize the modern interpretation of Congressional delegation
and endorse the modern approach to free exercise claims and will
conclude with an argument that Title 45, Section 147.130 is unconstitutional on the grounds of improper legislative delegation and viola524 U.S. 417 (1998) (regarding the extent of the executive power to veto and the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
4
The Supreme Court averaged approximately eight First Amendment cases a term between 2000 and 2010, excluding the 2007-2008 term, for which information was unavailable. Supreme Court Cases, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
supreme-court-cases (last visited May 19, 2013).
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter PPACA], Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
See Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of
Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009) (transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care).
7
See PPACA, supra note 5.
8
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
9
45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
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tion of the Free Exercise Clause.
II.

THE PPACA AND THE HHS MANDATE

The concepts that underlie the PPACA, though it would not
assume that title until later, were first encouraged by President
Obama during his remarks to a joint session of Congress in 2009.10
In his speech to Congress regarding the state of health care in the nation, President Obama explained the regular failure of each president
of the preceding century to overhaul and reform the health care industry in America.11 President Obama made his intentions quite clear
when he explained, “[o]ur collective failure to meet this challenge—
year after year, decade after decade—has led us to the breaking
point . . . . We are the only democracy—the only advanced democracy on Earth—the only wealthy nation—that allows such hardship for
millions of its people.”12
The problems facing the American people were clear to the
President. These issues, that affected many Americans, included
higher premium costs with less coverage, denial of insurance for preexisting conditions, and financial burdens placed on taxpayers in order to support government programs such as Medicaid and Medicare,
among others.13 In order to address these issues, the President illustrated the goals he hoped to achieve, as well as his plan to accomplish
those goals.14 For those with health insurance, the President wanted
to ensure that the plan would work better for the consumer, meaning
that the insurance companies would not be able to drop subscribers
who developed chronic illnesses, nor could companies deny one service because of any “arbitrary cap.”15 For those without insurance,
the plan would offer “quality, affordable choices” by way of a new
insurance exchange.16 Lastly, the President wanted to hold the insurance companies accountable and stem the rising price of health
10

Obama, supra note 6.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. (explaining that his plan will “provide more security and stability to those who have
health insurance. It will provide insurance for those who don’t. And it will slow the growth
of health care costs for our families, our business, and our government”).
15
Obama, supra note 6.
16
Id.
11
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care.17
In working with Congress to enact the PPACA, President
Obama was able to, for the most part, achieve these goals. For some,
the PPACA was a blessing—it allowed them to obtain more affordable health care or, for some citizens with pre-existing conditions, it
provided an opportunity for coverage which had not existed for decades.18 However, some provisions of the bill gave rise to regulations
that reignited the debate concerning the role of government and the
private religious beliefs of citizens.19
Within the first several pages of the PPACA was Title I, Section 1001(5), enacted as Title 42, Section 300gg-13(a)(4). In relevant
part, subsection (a)(4) reads:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage
shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not
impose any cost sharing requirements for—with respect to women, such additional preventative care and
screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration for
purposes of this paragraph.20
Utilizing this language, the Department of Health and Human Services created what has now become known as the Health and Human
Services Contraception Mandate (“HHS Mandate”).21 Under the
HHS Mandate, contraceptive services are now included under the
umbrella of preventative care for women.22 At the same time, the
Mandate granted an exemption to religious institutions.23 Despite
this exemption, religious groups and individuals across the country
found this exemption too greatly truncated in comparison to other
17

Id.
PPACA, supra note 5.
19
Editorial, A New Battle Over Contraception, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/opinion/sunday/a-new-battle-over-contraception.html
[hereinafter A New Battle].
20
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006).
21
45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
22
Women’s Preventative Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines [hereinafter HRSA Guidelines], HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
23
45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
18
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comparable federal laws and regulations.24
At the time of this Comment’s writing, there have been several iterations of the HHS Mandate, the most recent25 being offered as a
compromise in an effort to quell the furor caused by the strict wording of the previously adopted final rule.26 First introduced in July of
2010, it was suggested that 45 CFR Subtitle A add section
147.130(a)(1)(iv) to match the proposed language of “coverage of
preventive health services” 27 as was enacted by the PPACA.28 Originally, there was no exemption to the coverage mandate.29 In an effort
to accommodate religious institutions with objections to contraceptive coverage, the agency promulgated the original exemption language in August 2011.30 The exemption defines a religious employer
as one that: “(1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose;
(2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a nonprofit organization described in section 6033(a)(1) and section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.”31
After a flurry of disapproval, the exemption was adopted as a
24
A New Battle, supra note 19. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (setting forth requirements
dictating what is a religious employer), with Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12187 (2006) (exempting “religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship”) and Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)
(2006) (“This subchapter [on equal opportunity employment] shall not apply to an employer
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”).
25
Coverage of Certain Preventable Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130) [hereinafter Coverage of Certain
Preventable Services].
26
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to the Coverage of Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725
(Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Group Health Plans I].
27
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75
Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,759 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final Rules for Group Health
Plans].
28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.
29
See Preventative Services under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra
note 27, at 41, 759.
30
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to the Coverage of Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46621,
46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Group Health Plans II].
31
Id.
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final rule and a “safe harbor” period was implemented.32 This “safe
harbor” period temporarily stayed the enforcement of the contraceptive coverage mandate for non-exempted, non-profit organizations
while the department determined a means to accommodate such
groups.33 In February 2012, the adoption of the final rule on mandated coverage of contraception was announced.34 The Final Rule announcement explained that statistics, public comments on the matter,
and the wording of the PPACA overwhelmingly supported the narrow exemption proposed by the amendment in August 2011.35 In
February 2013, another amendment was proposed that would greatly
expand the exemption and allow for exemption of specific institutions currently not covered by the exemption.36
III.

DELEGATION, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, AND FREE EXERCISE

The nature of government, the role of the individual branches
in our tripartite system of government, and the interpretation of the
Constitution have all experienced transformations since the founding
of the United States.37 Even more so, this past century has seen significant advances in technology, great cultural movements, and
changes in interpersonal relations. This Section will provide insight
into the changes that have occurred in the realm of Congressional
delegation and the First Amendment’s guarantee regarding freedom
of religion.
A.

The Nondelegation Doctrine in the Twentieth
Century

Following the Preamble, the very first words of the Constitution of the United States read: “All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”38 Though a seemingly
32

Group Health Plans I, supra note 26, at 8727.
Id. at 8727-28.
34
Id. at 8730.
35
Id. at 8726-27.
36
Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25.
37
The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
38
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
33
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innocuous prescription, this section of the Constitution, also known
as the Nondelegation Clause,39 has spawned a doctrine of proscription that has a legacy dating back more than a century, most cogently
recognized in the 1892 decision of Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark.40
More than 120 years ago, the Supreme Court explained that it
was universally recognized that the legislative power of the Congress
could not be delegated to the Executive branch without compromising the integrity of the tripartite system of government established by
the Constitution.41 In an attempt to better illustrate the limitations of
Article I, Section 1, the Court referenced two particular State Supreme Court decisions from Ohio and Pennsylvania.42 Drawing upon
the language of Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners,43 Justice Harlan explained that there was a marked difference between the “delegation of
power to make the law . . . and conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution.”44 In Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the difference between legislative and executive discretion, noting that the power to make law involves discretion
as to what the law shall command or prohibit and the authority to execute the law involves the discretion to implement and exercise the
law.45 In an attempt to further distinguish the delegation of power to
make law and the grant of discretion to implement law, the Court
borrowed language from Pennsylvania’s Locke’s Appeal.46 It was
held in Locke that “[t]he legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action depend.”47 In finding the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s distinction applicable to the controversy before it in
1892, the Marshall Field Court reiterated an understanding that although Congress may not delegate its authority to create laws, it is
39

The Recent Controversy over the Non Delegation Doctrine, ENVTL. LAW & PROP. RTS
PRACTICE GROUP NEWSLETTER (Fed. Soc., D.C.) Oct. 1, 1999.
40
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
41
Id. at 692.
42
Id. at 693-94.
43
The Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville, Rail Road Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton
Cnty., 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
44
Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94 (citing Rail Road Co., 1 Ohio St. 77).
45
Rail Road Co., 1 Ohio St. at 88.
46
72 Pa. 491 (1873).
47
Id. at 498.
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very much able to delegate the authority to create implementation
strategy and standards.48
The issue was next handled in earnest approximately thirtyfive years later in the case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States.49 In this decision, regarding Congress’s ability to grant the
Executive branch authority to alter tariff rates, the Court cited not only Field v. Clark, but also Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners.50 As in
the aforementioned cases, the Court in J.W. Hampton was faced with
the issue of whether vesting the Executive branch with the authority
to determine details of execution and penalty of a duly passed Congressional law was valid under Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,51 each of which respectively granted all
legislative power52 and further governing powers to the Congress. 53
Drawing upon the earlier Supreme Court decision of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,54 the Court held that
“[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”55 This holding later became the standard
rule for cases in which the Court had to determine whether Congress

48

Field, 143 U.S. at 694.
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
50
Id. at 407, 410.
51
Id. at 404.
52
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers “in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”).
53
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, . . . borrow money on credit of the United States, . . . regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, . . .
establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization, . . . coin Money, . . . provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting, . . . establish Post Offices, . . . promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, . . . define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, . . .
raise and support Armies, . . . provide and maintain a Navy, . . . make Rules for the government and Regulation of land and naval Forces, . . . provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, . . . provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, . . . exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District, . . . make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper”).
54
224 U.S. 194 (1912). “The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a
commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission
shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular
situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter
within the rules laid down by the Congress.” Id. at 214.
55
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
49
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had delegated legislative authority or discretion of implementation.56
During the New Deal era of the 1930s, the Court once again
wrote several opinions regarding propriety of delegation to the Executive branch in cases such as Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan57 (“Hot
Oil”) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,58 both
dealing with the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”). 59 In the
Hot Oil case, the Court rejected Title 1, Section 9(c) of NIRA, which
authorized the president to prohibit the transportation of petroleum60
on the basis that the section gave him the authority to make policy
and enforce such policy at his discretion.61 Further, the Court found
that none of the provisions surrounding Section 9(c) provided any
limitation on the discretion granted to the president, thus vesting him
with legislative authority.62 In his dissent, Justice Cardozo explained
that he found the delegation of power to the president not to be unlimited, but rather to be “canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.”63 He explained that both Field and J.W. Hampton established a standard with “elasticity for adjustment,” different from
what he perceived to be the majority’s application of the standard
with “pedantic rigor.”64
In Schechter, the Court similarly held that the “Live Poultry
Code” created under the authority of Section three of NIRA was unconstitutional on the ground that it essentially granted the president
the authority to codify “codes of fair competition” into law.65 The
56

See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (Hot Oil), 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
57
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
58
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
59
Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195-211, repealed by Ex. Ord. No. 7252,
Dec. 21, 1935.
60
Title I, Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act reads:
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or
order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other
duly authorized agency of a State.
Hot Oil, 293 U.S. at 406.
61
Hot Oil, 293 U.S. at 416.
62
Id. at 420.
63
Id. at 440 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
64
Id.
65
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-22, 529.
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Court held that Section three “sets up no standards, aside from the
statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and explanation described in section one.”66 The decision was joined by Justice Cardozo, who commented, “[T]his code is not canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant if I
may borrow my own words in an earlier opinion.”67 In other words,
as far as Justice Cardozo was concerned, the language granting the
president the discretion in the Live Poultry Code was much broader
and less confining than the language found in the grant of discretion
provided in Hot Oil. In so holding, the Court in Hot Oil and Schechter deemed the intelligible principle of the legislation to be lacking in
specificity.68
A decade later, the Court held in American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC69 that as long as “Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of
this delegated authority,”70 a delegation to the Executive will be a
constitutional delegation of discretion and not of legislative authority.71 Despite Hot Oil, Schechter, and affirmation of the J.W. Hampton rule in American Power, the Court began to adopt a more lenient
approach to applying the “intelligible principle” test, very rarely, if
ever, finding delegations to be unconstitutional.72 As Justice Scalia
explained in the 2001 Whitman v. American Trucking Association73
case, “[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law.’ ”74 Justice Scalia’s point
66

Id. at 541.
Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (referencing Hot Oil).
68
Hot Oil, 293 U.S. 388 (holding 8-1, Justice Cardozo dissenting); Schechter, 295 U.S.
495 (holding unanimously, Justice Cardozo concurring).
69
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
70
Id. at 105.
71
Id.
72
The Court has a long history of allowing Congress to grant Executive agencies broad
discretion in determining if Congress’s vague standards have been met. See, e.g., Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1994) (“fair and equitable”); Lichter v. United States, 334
U.S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (“excessive profits”); Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105 (“unfair and
inequitable”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 691, 600 (1944)
(“just and reasonable”); Nat’l Broad. Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (“as
public interest, convenience, or necessity [require]”).
73
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
74
Id. at 474-75 (quoting Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416
(1989)).
67
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is further illustrated by a list of decisions in Mistretta v. United
States75 indicating that in the 1940s alone, just a few scant years after
the NIRA decisions, the Supreme Court had approved such broad
delegations of authority.76
B.

Freedom of Religion Under the First Amendment

According to some scholars, religious freedom was not just
the impetus for religious sects to leave Europe for the New World to
establish enclaves77 but it was also, in the view of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, “a central feature of the reformed and republican
government.”78 Religious freedom in the seventeenth century was
very different from today. During the age of exploration, toleration
was the extent of religious freedom, compared to the broader, more
modern concept of free exercise.79
To best understand how the colonies came to be founded upon
religious lines,80 it is important to understand the history and politics
of Europe during the preceding centuries and, in particular, England.
Often credited as the catalyst for increased religious persecution in
England, King Henry VIII seized control of the English Church in an
effort to annul his marriage following the Pope’s disapproval.81 With
this seizure came a joining of the ecclesiastic influence of the church
and the political influence of the monarchy. As the joint head of these two powerful influences, Henry VIII utilized persecution and repression of other faiths as means of achieving political ends.82 Ed75

488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989).
See cases cited supra note 72.
77
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 50 (1998).
78
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 29
(1986).
79
Id. at 4.
80
NOONAN, JR., supra note 77, at 50. (“New Plymouth was founded by Separatists from
the Church of England who were committed to a church composed of the born-again. Massachusetts Bay Colony was founded by Christians seeking a purer church than the Church of
England.”).
81
T. Daniel Shumate, Introduction, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE
MASON 9, 14 (T. Daniel Shumate ed., 1985).
82
Id. at 15. See also G. M. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 298-99 (Illustrated Ed. 1966). “Henry VIII burnt Protestants, while hanging and beheading Catholic
opponents of an anti-clerical revolution. And this policy, which appears so strange to-day
[sic], then met with much popular approval in England.” Id.
76
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ward VI, Henry’s successor, oversaw the slow shift of the Church of
England towards Protestantism with a favoritism placed upon the
Protestants.83 Edward’s successor and sister, Mary, favored the
Catholics, a practice that threatened the stability of the nation.84 During the reign of Elizabeth, the sister of Edward VI and Mary, tensions
were tight in England with rising Anti-Catholicism caused mainly by
the threat of the Armada and the attempt to overthrow Elizabeth by
Catholic Spain.85 Following Elizabeth was a line of monarchs insisting they “ruled with absolute power by divine right.”86 By the time
the reign of Charles began in 1625, friction among the various Christian factions within England was widespread.87 Only a few decades
later the Anglican Church was dissolved and Calvinist Oliver Cromwell led the charge against Roman Catholics in Ireland.88
Considering the political and religious quagmire that was seventeenth century England, it should come as little surprise that as
English holdings in the United States grew, each religion found its
home in one colony or another.89 While the concentration of specific
religious groups in certain colonies served the purpose of freedom of
religion sought by many of the former English folk, the modern concept of religious freedom would not even begin to be considered until
the drafting of the United States Constitution. However, one of the
83

TREVELYAN, supra note 82, at 312. As a young king, ascending to the throne at the age
of nine, Edward conducted his rule by counsel of advisors, including his uncles of mixed
religions. Id. Hugh Latimer, a major figure in the emerging Protestant movement, played a
large role in Edward’s religious life and influenced his rule of England. Id. at 313.
84
Id. at 320-21. Mary’s favoritism of Catholics went beyond disfavor but resembled
more of a fanaticism when she “revived the heresy laws allowing the spiritual courts and the
Privy Council to burn alive believing Protestants at their pleasure.” Id. at 320. In less than
four years, the Queen had burnt more than 400 men and women alive. TREVELYAN, supra
note 82, at 321. In response to Mary’s zealous policies, “Protestant zeal” surfaced among
the commoners. Id.
85
Shumate, supra note 81, at 16. During the time of her reign, Elizabeth did her best to
rectify the situation, reinstating Protestantism as the State Church and keeping persecution of
Catholics to a minimum. TREVELYAN, supra note 82, at 321 n.1. With the threat of the Armada of Catholic Spain looming, Elizabeth was even successful at maintaining the loyalty of
moderate Catholics alongside the Protestants. Id. at 353.
86
Shumate, supra note 81, at 16.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 17-18.
89
Id. at 33 (explaining that Anglicans were in the south and New York; Puritans controlled New England with the exception of Rhode Island, which was controlled partly by
Roger Williams and partly by the Baptists; the Quakers in early Pennsylvania and West Jersey; the Catholics in Maryland; and the Presbyterians made a stronghold in Pennsylvania).
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earliest attempts at legally protecting religious freedom arose during
the drafting of the Virginia Convention.90 Introduced by George Mason in 1776, the Virginia Declaration of Rights is considered to be
the “grandfather of all the bills of rights.”91 Under Mason’s initial
draft, “[r]eligion was to be ‘governed only by Reason and Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore . . . all Men shou’d enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the
Dictates of Conscience.’ ”92 For some members of the convention,
such as young James Madison, toleration alone was insufficient to
protect the religious rights of the citizens.93
While attending the College of New Jersey (now Princeton),
Madison was exposed to the teachings and arguments of the
“Whiggish prerevolutionary atmosphere” that found the term “toleration” to be troublesome.94 The students of the College of New Jersey
regularly argued, and were bolstered by the agreement of College
President John Witherspoon, that toleration was a concept of condescension in that it implied “some institution or belief [to be] in a superior position from which to do the tolerating.”95 Madison’s adoption of this opinion is clear, for shortly after Mason presented his
draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison successfully
suggested expanding the “fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion”96 to be an “unqualified freedom of conscience.”97
Modern discourses on freedom of religion focus primarily on
the concern of free exercise, with the first half of the clause relegated
to the occasional conversation of whether a law by Congress favors
one religion over another, since the establishment of a state religion is
expressly and unambiguously prohibited by the First Amendment.98
Although a foreign concept to modern Americans, the establishment
of State or Federal religions was endorsed by many statesmen during
90

Robert Rutland, George Mason and the Origins of the First Amendment, in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 81, 91 (T. Daniel Shumate ed., 1985).
91
Id. at 90.
92
Id. at 91.
93
MILLER, supra note 78, at 29.
94
Id. at 4.
95
Id.
96
Rutland, supra note 90, at 91.
97
See MILLER, supra note 78 (discussing Madison’s disdain for “mere toleration”).
98
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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the colonial and revolutionary periods.99 For such a reason, the original draft proposed by Madison reading, “[t]he civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal right
of conscience be in any manner, or under any pretext infringed,”
drew criticism.100 Several drafts of the First Amendment went
through committees which vigorously debated the non-establishment
clause, with particular concern raised by a delegate from Rhode Island regarding a minister’s ability to sue in state court.101 However,
most troubling to many delegates was the implication that the nonestablishment clause would apply to the states and prohibit the states
from providing financial aid and assistance to the favorite religious
body in their borders.102 Despite the severe trimming of Madison’s
Amendment, the Congress eventually passed the bill with the final
language reading, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”103
C.

Free Exercise and the Court

Starting with the early Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court
saw a boom in the number of cases seeking review of the constitutionality of legislation that allegedly infringed upon the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.104 Below are the facts and analyses
of two seminal cases regarding the contemporary interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. These two cases created separate rules that
courts were to apply when dealing with these constitutional issues.
i.

The Sherbert Test

Appellant Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was released
99

NOONAN, JR., supra note 77, at 82 (regarding the First Congress which “petitioned the
president to set a day of thanksgiving to God; created chaplaincies; and made grants of public property for the support of religion”).
100
Id. at 79.
101
Id. at 80. “Ban of an establishment, however, drew criticism. Suppose, said Mr. Huntington of Rhode Island, that a minister brought suit in federal court for his salary, the
amendment might lead to denial of his suit, for ‘a support of ministers might be construed
[as] a religious establishment.’ ” Id.
102
Id.
103
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104
See infra Parts III.C.i. & ii.
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from employment by her employer after refusing to work on Saturdays.105 Thus, she was terminated for refusing to work on her day of
Sabbath.106 The addition of a sixth workday, at the time, was a new
development at the textile-mill that employed Sherbert.107 Due to her
“conscientious scruples” regarding Saturday labor, Sherbert had no
luck obtaining work in other mills that had also implemented a six
day work-week policy.108 As a result, Sherbert applied for compensation benefits from the state under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act.109
Upon review of her application, the Employment Security
Commission found Sherbert to be ineligible to collect benefits because she disqualified herself in refusing work that required Saturday
labor.110 The Commission found that Sherbert had “fail[ed], without
good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the employer[,]’ ”111 therefore disqualifying her
under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.112 At
trial, Sherbert argued that the disqualification section of the South
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act113 ran afoul of her religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.114 However, the Commission’s ruling was sustained in the local Court of Common Pleas and affirmed by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.115 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
statute “places no restriction upon the appellant’s freedom of religion
nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and
freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dic-

105

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
Id.
107
Id. at 399 n.1.
108
Id. at 399.
109
Id. at 399-400; S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3)(a) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-35-120(5)(a)(i)(B)).
110
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
111
Id.; see S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35120(5)(a)(i)(B)).
112
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401; S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3)(a) (current version at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(5)(a)(i)(B)).
113
S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120).
114
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401; U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . ”).
115
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
106
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tate of her conscience.”116 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.117
In its opinion, the Court examined whether the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act burdened a worker’s freedom to
practice religion when accepting work would directly affect an individual’s ability to observe his or her religion.118 In short, the Court
sought to determine if South Carolina’s statute was unconstitutional
because it failed to account for religious individuals who could not
work due to religious obligations. The Court proceeded to illustrate
that most of the previous decisions regarding infringement of an individual’s free exercise had often been easily determined.119 However,
there were some instances in which the government infringed on free
exercise rights in the name of “public safety, peace or order.”120
The Court stated that in order for legislation or regulation to
survive Constitutional challenge under the Free Exercise Clause, the
statute must either place no burden upon one’s constitutional right to
freely exercise religion,121 or, in the event that the legislation does indeed infringe upon constitutional rights, any burden must be justified
by a “compelling state interest.”122 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas deftly noted that the result reached by the Court should not
necessarily focus upon the degree to which the infringement burdened the individual, but whether there was an infringement at all.123
According to Justice Douglas, the First Amendment was meant to
keep government out of that area of privacy, not to provide the government with a range of how far it could intrude.124
116

Id. (citing 240 S.C. 286, 303-04).
Id. at 401-02.
118
Id. at 406.
119
Id. at 402 (explaining that previous cases held that the “[g]overnment may neither
compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or
groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing
power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views”) (internal citations omitted).
120
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or
principles, for ‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not
totally free from legislative restrictions.’ The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order . . . . ” (citing Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603)).
121
Id.
122
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
123
Id. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).
124
Id.
117
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In order to determine whether the disqualification sections of
the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act would survive
constitutional challenge, the Court first addressed whether the South
Carolina statute disqualifying Sherbert from collecting unemployment proved to be a burden on her free exercise of religion. 125 To answer this, the Court referred to an earlier decision in which it held
that any law that has the purpose or effect of impeding one’s observance of religion, or discriminates among religions either directly
or indirectly, is to be deemed burdensome.126 According to Braunfeld
v. Brown,127 such a law would be “constitutionally invalid.”128 In describing the ruling of South Carolina’s Supreme Court, the Sherbert
Court explained that the State forces individuals to choose between
either accepting work and forfeiting religious observance or forfeiting
work in order to observe a religious precept.129 Accordingly, the
Sherbert Court found that such a policy forcing such a decision penalizes individuals who choose to follow the precepts of their religion, thus infringing upon free exercise of their religious rights.130
After determining that a burden upon free exercise did exist,
the Court next addressed whether such an imposition was justified by
a compelling state interest.131 According to precedent, “in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ ”132
As such, only paramount interests of the state were legitimate enough
to permit placing a burden on the ability to practice one’s religion.
As justification, the State claimed that the possibility of
fraudulent claims effectively diluting the compensation fund and hindering Saturday scheduling for employers was a paramount interest
for South Carolina.133 The Court rejected this argument, adding that
even if this was a legitimate excuse, it would still be the State’s re125

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld).
127
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
128
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 406.
131
Id. In Braunfield, the Court held that a compelling state interest would justify the
state’s encroachment into an individual’s free exercise of religion. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at
607.
132
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
133
Id.
126
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sponsibility to demonstrate that this policy was the least restrictive
form of regulation to prevent such abuses.134 Since South Carolina
lacked a “countervailing factor,”135 such as the “strong state interest
in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers” 136 as articulated
in Braunfeld, the Court found that the State’s justification for making
Sherbert’s religion a basis for ineligibility was not a compelling State
interest.137 The Court thus determined that in order for a statute to
survive constitutional challenge, the State must prove that the statute
does not burden free exercise and if it does, the statute is the least restrictive means of serving a paramount state interest. These elements
subsequently became known as the Sherbert test.138
In his conclusion, Justice Brennan explained that the Court
was holding that South Carolina could not enforce the ineligibility
statute against an individual whose religious convictions prevented
him from working on a day of rest without violating the Constitution.139 The Court’s intention in issuing such a narrow holding was to
prevent the decision from being read to dictate any particular scheme
upon which states were to build benefit programs.140 Although the
Court’s holding was not supposed to be seen as tinkering with the
structure of any welfare/benefit program, its decision achieved its
goal of reaffirming that states are prohibited from infringing upon individuals’ rights to religious exercise in determining eligibility for
such programs, unless such an infringement could be justified by a

134
Id. at 407. “For even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund
and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.” (internal citations omitted). The Court also took note of
several decisions from the Supreme Courts of North Carolina, Michigan, and Ohio, which
had previously “granted benefits to person who were physically available for work but unable to find suitable employment solely because of a religious prohibition against Saturday
work.” See id. at 407 n.7.
135
Id. at 408.
136
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408.
137
See id. at 409.
138
Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 1176, 1183-84 (jurisd.1973)
(explaining that “[t]he Sherbert test set forth above and as applied to this case requires a
showing by the government that a decision protecting the religious activity in question
would be likely to result in placing a substantial burden on the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to collect the tax revenues to which it is entitled”).
139
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
140
Id.
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compelling state interest.141
ii.

The Smith Test

Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked together at a private
drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon.142 The two were subsequently fired from their positions with the rehabilitation organization
for ingesting peyote.143 The peyote the pair ingested was used in a
sacramental manner during a Native American Church ceremony.144
Both Smith and Black were members of the Native American
Church.145 Upon being fired, respondents sought unemployment
compensation from the Employment Division of Oregon, which determined that the two were “ineligible for benefits because they had
been discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’ ”146
Under Oregon state law, the intentional possession of a controlled substance, as defined by federal law147 and modified by Oregon state law,148 is prohibited unless a doctor prescribes such a substance.149 Because Oregon classified peyote as a Schedule I drug,150
possession of such drug is a Class B felony.151 Furthermore, the Oregon Supreme Court only a few years earlier held that its state statute

141

Id.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
143
Id. Peyote is defined as “any of several cacti related to or resembling mescal.”
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 991 (2d ed. 2000). Also called MESCAL
BUTTON . . . one of the dried tops of the mescal cactus, containing the hallucinogen mescalin.” Id. at 831.
144
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 874; see Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2006).
148
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.005(6) (1987) (defining “controlled
substance”).
149
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987) (current version at §
475.752(3) (2011)). In relevant part, the statute reads, “It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of professional practice . . . .” Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.752(3).
150
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Admin. Rule 855-080-0021(3) (1988).
151
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(a) (current version at §
475.752(3)(a) (2011)). In relevant part, the statute reads: “Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: (a) A controlled substance in Schedule I, is guilty of a Class B felony, except as otherwise provided in ORS 475.864.” Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.752(3)(a).
142
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does not exempt sacramental use of drugs.152 After remand from the
Supreme Court of the United States,153 Oregon’s highest court found
the prohibition to be invalid, determining that the State “could not
deny unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in
that [religious] practice [of ingesting peyote].”154 The Employment
Division appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari once
again to consider whether Oregon’s prohibition of peyote ingestion
for religious use was permissible under the Free Exercise Clause.155
In the majority opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, the Court
started by attempting to define free exercise of religion. According to
Scalia, free exercise of religion is a freedom of conscience to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine or creed one desires.156 Furthermore, free exercise is not confined strictly to belief and profession of faith, but also extends to the fulfillment of the prescriptions
and proper adherence to the proscriptions of religions.157 The Court
concluded its definition of free exercise claiming that a state would
certainly be burdening one’s right to free exercise if the legal prohibition against certain acts applied only when performed for a religious
purpose or only when related to a religious belief.158 Thus, the Court
maintained that requiring adherence to generally applicable laws
which may contradict a religious prescription or proscription does not
necessarily prohibit free exercise of religion.159
152

Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (quoting 307 Ore. 68, 72-73 (1988)).
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
In Smith I, the Court acknowledged that “if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws
certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment benefits to
person who engage in that conduct.” Id. at 670. Since Oregon’s courts had yet to determine
whether the state prohibition on peyote ingestion also applied to religious and sacramental
purposes, the Court determined that it would not be “appropriate . . . to decide whether the
practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 673. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine the status of religious consumption of peyote.
Id. at 674.
154
Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
155
Id. (“This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the
reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously
inspired use.”).
156
Id. at 877.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 877-78.
159
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
153
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Appealing to precedent, the Court explained that “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ”160 Furthermore, it would seem that
the only instances in which the Court found a neutral, generally applicable law inapplicable to religious behavior was when a “hybrid
situation” was present—meaning that the law in question affected not
only the Free Exercise Clause but another constitutional protection,
such as freedom of speech or print.161 In the instant case, the Court
found that no such hybrid situation was present.162
Upon deciding that the only issue before the Court was that of
free exercise of religion, the Court explained that not only had the
Sherbert test been less popular in application leading up to the instant
case, but that it was generally inapplicable as it pertained to the present case.163 According to the Court’s previous decision in Bowen v.
Roy,164 the “decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious
hardship’ without compelling reason.”165 Thus, in cases lacking individual exemptions, the Sherbert test is not to be used.
What is made clear from Smith is that the Court distinguishes
among neutral, generally applicable laws and laws that have individual exemptions. Following this distinction, it is important to recognize the implications of one of the Court’s later statements: “[W]e
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied
to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order.”166
160
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
161
Id. at 881-82 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion/speech);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (religion/speech); Follett v. McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944) (religion/speech); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (religion
/ rights of parents); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religion / rights of parents)).
162
Id. at 882.
163
Id. at 885.
164
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
165
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 708).
166
Id. at 888. In essence, what the Court is claiming here is that in the interest of judicial
efficiency, all regulations will be presumed to be constitutionally valid in terms of protection
of rights.
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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A.

Intelligible Principles and the New Millennium

Beginning in the 1980s, the approach of some Justices regarding delegation evolved. For example, in the Whitman v. American
Trucking Association167 decision, Justice Thomas filed a concurring
opinion in which he questioned the wisdom of the Intelligible Principle Doctrine.168
The Court held in Whitman that although Congress set forth a
broad delegation standard for the Environmental Protection Agency,
it still served as an intelligible principle when compared to some of
the other standards the Court had previously accepted.169 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas mentioned that despite the fact that the argument before the Court was one regarding the constitutionality of
the delegation, the parties briefed with “barely a nod to the text of the
Constitution.”170 He further remarked that if anything, the concept of
intelligible principle further complicates very simple Constitutional
language: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.”171
In ending his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated very clearly
that if the proper case were to present itself he would be willing to
reexamine whether the Court has strayed too far from the original intent and understanding of separation of powers. As of this Comment’s writing, there is little evidence to suggest that such a case has
arisen.
B.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the
States

In direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith,

167

Whitman, 531 U.S. 457. Under Congressional legislation, the Environmental Protection Agency was delegated authority to determine air quality standards necessary to protect
the public health. Id. The American Trucking Association claimed this was a delegation of
legislative authority. Id.
168
Id. at 486-87.
169
See cases cited supra note 72.
170
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487.
171
Id. (quoting U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 1).
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Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”).172 RFRA’s Congressional findings explained that in
Smith, “the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion . . . .”173 In dismissing the test set forth in
Smith as unworkable, compared to the workable compelling interest
test established in earlier federal decisions, Congress clearly rejected
the Smith test and opted to codify the test established in Sherbert to
best provide individuals with claims and defenses when their religious exercise is substantially burdened by a governmental body.174
The test established by RFRA is actually stricter than the
Sherbert test. RFRA adds an additional element requiring the government to prove that the burden placed upon an individual’s free exercise of religion was the least restrictive means of serving that compelling governmental interest; thus, the government is prohibited
from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the
government can demonstrate that “application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”175 The statute also clarifies the definition of
“government,” using the term to encompass “a branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under
color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity . . . .”176
Despite RFRA’s overwhelming support in Congress,177 in the
1997 decision of City of Boerne v. Flores,178 the Supreme Court held

172

Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
174
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
175
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (requiring that the State illustrate that there was no burden on a person’s exercise of religion, or in the event of a burden,
that such a burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest), with Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 403 (requiring that the State illustrate that there was no infringement on an individual’s constitutional rights of free exercise or, in the event of a burden, the State must illustrate
that such infringement is justified by a “compelling state interest”).
176
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1).
177
Bill Summary and Status, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (H.R.1308) (listing major actions: passed the House by voice vote on 10/27/1993; passed the Senate by Yea-Nay
Vote of 97-3 on 10/27/1993).
178
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
173
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RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to the states. 179 In Boerne, the
Archbishop of San Antonio gave a local parish permission to expand
its church’s structure.180 When the parish applied to the City of
Boerne for a building permit, the City denied the application, citing
an ordinance that required the Historic Landmark Commission to approve any construction in the historic district in which the church was
located.181 The Archbishop commenced proceedings against the City
of Boerne, primarily relying upon RFRA.182
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision
finding RFRA unconstitutional as it applies to the states, explaining
that the heavy litigation resulting from the Act, coupled with the limiting effect that the Act had on the states’ police powers placed excessive burdens upon the states.183 Furthermore, the Court explained
that the imposition of the least restrictive means requirement, which
was not part of any pre-Smith test, placed an additional burden on the
states.184 The Court further indicated that the legislation was far
broader than necessary or appropriate in order to serve its purpose of
preventing and remedying violations of the Free Exercise Clause.185
Accordingly, the Court determined that despite Congress’s broad
powers under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,186 RFRA violated the very idea of federalism and federal-state
balance, and was thus unconstitutional as it applied to the states.187
Despite the Flores decision, the Court has maintained that
RFRA is constitutional when applied to federal laws.188 In the case
of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,189
the Supreme Court found that although the appellees utilized
Hoasca,190 a substance prohibited under the Controlled Substance
179

Id. at 536.
Id. at 512.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Flores, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
184
Id. at 535.
185
Id.
186
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
187
Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
188
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
189
546 U.S. 418 (2006) [hereinafter O Centro].
190
Ayahuasca is defined as “a woody South American vine, Banisteriopis caapi, of the
mapighia family, having bark that is the source of harmine, a hallucinogenic alkaloid used by
180
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Act,191 in their religious ceremonies, the Government failed to provide a compelling governmental interest in the barring of the sacramental use of Hoasca, and therefore, violated the free exercise rights
of the church.192 Although the Court recognized that it had previously ruled RFRA to be unconstitutional when applied to the states,193 as
well as the past difficulty in applying the test,194 the Court still illustrated deference to Congress’s judgment in enacting RFRA, thus
maintaining the validity and constitutionality of the Act.195
Although RFRA may be difficult and onerous for courts to
apply, the Act is valid law and serves as a supererogatory, yet legislatively desired, constitutional protection. As noted above, in 2006 the
Supreme Court upheld the requirement that the federal government
must demonstrate that a particular action, regulation, or statute has
not substantially burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion, or
in the event that it has, did so in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.196
V.

A COMMENT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A.

Advocacy for the Reapplication of the
Nondelegation Doctrine

Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution is far from ambiguous.
It is not difficult to understand what the Framers intended when they
wrote that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”197 There is but one way a reader could,
and should, interpret that sentence, and that is that all legislative
powers and responsibilities are conferred on Congress.
Indians of the Amazon bain.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 95 (2d ed.
2000).
191
O Centro, 546 U.S. at 423.
192
Id. at 439.
193
Id. at 424 n.1.
194
Id. at 439.
195
Id.
196
See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 429.
197
U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
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Among the numerous essays Madison wrote under the name
of Publius, he often referenced a particularly important feature of the
then newly proposed bicameral legislature system—the election system. In Federalist 37, Madison explained the virtue of having those
who were elected being dependent on those that elected them.198 He
stated that because the power is derived from the people, the short
duration of the elected official’s term forces continued dependence.199
He further explained that the liberties of the people are best protected
by frequent elections of representatives,200 reflecting on the maxim
that “the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration . . . .”201
In electing a Congress, the people choose representatives that
they believe will best represent them in the creation of laws and the
funding of programs.202 When that Congress abdicates its power to
legislate to a body of bureaucrats, the security provided by its having
individuals maintain positions at the will of the people is lost.203
There is an inherent danger in granting the power to legislate to the
Executive. Delegation of legislative authority to the very same body
that possesses the authority to enforce the product of the legislative
authority amounts to a concentration of power the Founders intended
to avoid. Many argue that some decisions are best made by a smaller
group of individuals who have a significantly higher level of proficiency and expertise in a given area.204 While this is true, without
legislative oversight of the final regulatory product, the decision making process is inherently undemocratic.
The House of Representatives is elected by the citizens of
given districts every two years,205 the Senate by citizens of the states
every six years,206 and the president by the citizens of the nation eve198

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 223 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id.
200
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
201
Id. at 327
202
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
203
Id. at 319 (explaining that “[a] dependence on the people is, not doubt, the primary
control on the government”).
204
Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292, 319 (explaining that “because of their
expertise and accountability, agencies are particularly well designed for making various
kinds of policy decisions”).
205
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
206
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
199
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ry four years.207 Furthermore, the Congress is made up of a total of
535 elected officials, with 435 in the House and 100 in the Senate.208
Vested with all legislative powers, only those 535 people have the
constitutionally granted power to make law.209
The Executive branch includes the President, an elected official, and all the federal agencies, which, under the concept of legislative delegation, have essentially developed the power to legislate.210
As of 2011, the federal agencies employed approximately 1,372,000
civilians.211 Furthermore, as the president is only one individual limited to two terms and elected every four years, as opposed to 435 representatives elected every two years, it can be argued that political recourse is substantially less available. Such delegation is the epitome
of an undemocratic practice. In handing off legislative decisions and
responsibilities, the Congress allows unelected bureaucrats, who are
not directly responsible to the citizens, to make decisions that could
otherwise have disastrous political ramifications for those actually
elected to make such decisions.
Although American citizens regularly go to the polls in order
to elect the 535 individuals who are supposed to make the laws for
this country, there are instead nearly 1.4 million unelected individuals
who could potentially legislate as long as Congress delegates to them
the power to do so in the form of an intelligible principle.212 In his
concurrence in Whitman, Justice Thomas stated that there are cases in
which an intelligible principle may be present but “the significance of
the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called
anything other than ‘legislative.’ ”213 Justice Thomas further noted
that since neither of the parties in Whitman examined the Constitution
in their respective pleadings nor requested that the Court reconsider
its decisions on delegation of legislative power, the Court was right in
207

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Members of Congress Questions and Answers, THE CENTER ON CONGRESS AT INDIANA
U., http://congress.indiana.edu/members-congress-questions-and-answers#why100 (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
209
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
210
See cases cited supra note 72.
211
Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federalemployment-reports/historical-tables/executive-branch-civilian-employment-since-1940/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
212
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
213
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487.
208
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not addressing the issue, although he explained that he would be willing to address whether the Court had strayed from the original intentions of separation of powers at another time.214
The path of deference that the Court followed in allowing the
legislature to abdicate a degree of its legislative authority to the executive agencies is one fraught with danger. In a government composed of three branches with their own respective roles of writing the
laws, enforcing the laws, and interpreting the laws, the Court has allowed a perilous relationship to be formed between the writers and
the enforcers. Though this is not an instance in which Montesquieu
would say that the legislature and the executive are “united in the
same person, or body of magistrates,”215 the delegation allowed by
the Court through its liberal interpretation of the “intelligible principle” doctrine does run afoul of Madison’s interpretation of Montesquieu’s logic. According to Madison, “[t]he magistrate in whom the
whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though
he can put a negative on every law . . . .” 216 Although the American
political structure does not literally allow the entirety of executive
power to rest in the President, as it would in a dictator or king, the
departments and agencies act as extensions of his will.217 The decisions of the departments and agencies are reflections of the goals and
agenda of each presidential administration, and as such, they essentially provide for the maintenance of “the whole executive power” by
the president.218
As such, the time has come to do precisely what Justice
Thomas mentions in the Whitman case—engage in a frank discussion
of modern delegation jurisprudence and how far it has strayed from
the language of the Constitution. This is not as much an issue of debate regarding the legacy of the Constitution as a “living” or “dead”
document,219 but rather an issue of genuine concern regarding the legitimacy of the tripartite government structure and the role of the executive agencies.

214

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
216
Id. at 299-300.
217
See Shuren, supra note 204, at 295-96.
218
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 215, at 299; see Shuren, supra note 204, at 195-96.
219
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693
(1976).
215
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Superiority of RFRA and the Sherbert Test

The Sherbert test is a superior test to the Smith test when it
comes to protecting an individual’s religious freedoms. Congress
agreed in 1993 when it enacted RFRA.220 Finding the holding of
Smith to be far too narrow, Congress codified the Sherbert test, with
the addition of a least restrictive means test.221 It is evident that
RFRA was created to address, not only the narrow holding of Smith,
but also the very disturbing final lines of Justice Scalia’s opinion.
At the end of his opinion, Scalia recognized that leaving the
determination of the accommodation of exemption for religious exercise to the political process would likely place less widely practiced
religions at a disadvantage.222 Scalia found this not only to be an
“unavoidable consequence of democratic governments,” but also to
be more desirable than a system in which “each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”223 Though she concurred in the judgment, Justice O’Connor recognized in her concurring opinion that for the majority opinion to apply as written, the First
Amendment could only be read to apply in the extreme situations in
which the State directly targets a particular religious practice.224 This
result, O’Connor explained, was lacking in precedent and demeaned
the very notion of the First Amendment’s free exercise protections.225
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor explained that, in her opinion, the
very reason the First Amendment was enacted was to protect the religious freedom and free exercise of religions which were not in the
majority.226 Scalia’s opinion clearly deems this protection to be burdensome on the Court and the legal system.227
Justice O’Connor’s concerns regarding relegation of religious
minorities to an inferior position have merit.228 The majority’s explanation that this disadvantage would be but a mere unavoidable
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
Id. at §§ 2000bb(a)(4), 2000bb-1(b)(2).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 894-96.
Id. at 902.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See supra Section III-B.
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consequence of democracy is, in particular, why the First Amendment was added to the Bill of Rights.229 The protections encompassed in the First Amendment authored by Madison were also supported by the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, who advocated for the
abolishment of the old British restrictions still on the books in Virginia.230 For a modern Court to allow religious minorities to be placed in
a position of disadvantage flies in the face of what the First Amendment stands for.
In Smith, the Court held that when a generally applicable, religion-neutral law burdens particular religious practices, the Government does not need to justify the burden with a compelling governmental interest.231 The Court explained that this approach was
justified in precedent in that the Court had adopted a similar standard
regarding generally applicable laws.232 With the passage of RFRA,
Congress made legislators more accountable for legislation that burdened the fundamental right of free exercise. Over the past century,
the Court has affirmed time and again that free exercise is indeed a
fundamental right.233 As a fundamental right, free exercise is guaranteed a higher standard of scrutiny than other liberties when determining whether the liberty has been burdened.234 In instances where minority groups could be subject to the will of the majority if it were not
for the protection guaranteed in the Constitution, a test requiring a
229

Id.
See MILLER, supra note 78, at 9 (explaining Jefferson’s list of particular restrictions
including the capital offense of heresy, the imprisonment of individuals denying the divinity
of scripture and the existence of the Trinity, as well as denial of certain rights to minority
religions such as government positions for Catholics or removal of children from Unitarian
homes as the parents/homes were “declared unfit”).
231
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
232
Id. (explaining that in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that
“race-neutral laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause;” and that the Court held that “generally applicable laws unconcerned with
regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment,” in Citizen Publ’g Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969)).
233
See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (“Unquestionably, the free exercise of
religion is a fundamental constitutional right.”); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (explaining that the Bill of Rights was intended to withdraw one’s “right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom to worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights . . . ” from the “vicissitudes of political controversy”).
234
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
230
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more searching level of scrutiny is certainly justifiable.235
Not only has the Court embraced the necessity of a more exacting scrutiny when it comes to alleged violations of the fundamental right of free exercise, but it has also come to reject the “slipperyslope” argument for exemptions from generally applicable laws for
free exercise reasons.236 In O Centro, the Court discussed that the
Sherbert precedent indicated a rejection of the government’s “slippery-slope” argument as it applied to free exercise.237 Under
Sherbert, and more recently Cutter v. Wilkinson,238 the Court determined that case-by-case considerations were feasible when determining religious exemptions for a generally applicable rule.239
C.

Delegation, 45 CFR 147.130, and the Threat to
American Liberty

Under the PPACA, the coverage of women’s preventative
care and screenings are required by shared cost plans.240 What is
necessarily covered under this broad topic was to be determined by
comprehensive guidelines created by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).241 The language of the clause is
clear: Congress granted authority to the HRSA to compile a comprehensive set of guidelines that would explain what preventative services and screenings were necessary. Included in these comprehensive guidelines are “contraceptive methods and counseling” which
include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”242
In July 2010, an interim final rule was adopted that would ap-

235

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436 (characterizing the slippery-slope argument as “the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to
make one for everybody, so no exceptions”).
237
Id.
238
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding religious accommodations
for incarcerated persons under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”)).
239
O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436.
240
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
241
Id.
242
HRSA Guidelines, supra note 22.
236
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ply HRSA standards under the PPACA,243 and in August 2011, an
amendment was presented by the Department of Health and Human
Services.244 Hoping to “provide for a religious accommodation that
respects the unique relationship between a house of worship and its
employees in ministerial positions,” the relevant departments amended interim final rules to allow the HRSA the discretion to formulate
an exemption for certain religious employers.245 The HRSA determined that an employer is exempt if it: (1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share
its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization under section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.246 Such
a definition of the exemption was included in the Final Rule adopted
on February 15, 2012.247
i.

The Delegation Issue

The language of the PPACA Section 1001(5) is a delegation
of legislative duty to the HRSA to alter the language of Public Health
Service Act Section 2713 (“Section 2713”). The delegation was for
the HRSA to create a set of standards that Congress would utilize to
define preventative care for women under Section 2713.248 Conversely, subsections one, two, three, and five of the same section directed that other required preventative health services would be determined and defined by preexisting standards already established by
the HRSA, the United States Preventative Services Task Force, and
the Center for Disease Control.249 As such, of the five subsections,
subsection four was the only one that constituted a delegation of legislative authority.
It is clear that subsection four is a delegation of legislative authority because of the language used in the Act dictating the use of
comprehensive guidelines: “[S]upported . . . for purposes of this par-

243
244
245
246
247
248
249

See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans, supra note 27.
Group Health Plans II, supra note 30, at 46623.
Id.
Id. at 46,626.
See Group Health Plans I, supra note 26.
PPACA, supra note 5.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.
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agraph.”250 Whereas Congress defers to previously determined
guidelines in the other subsections, subsection four authorizes the
HRSA to determine the guidelines it will choose to apply regarding
women’s preventative care and screening.251 In dictating what guidelines in entirety will apply to other sections and leaving this section to
the discretion of the executive agency, Congress has effectively delegated its legislative power.
In order for a delegation to be legitimate, it must be shown
that Congress, by an act of legislation, has laid down an intelligible
principle that clearly dictates the general policy, the entity that will
apply it, and the boundaries of such delegated authority. 252 Despite
the Court’s acknowledgement of its deferential attitude towards Congress’s power to delegate,253 this situation is distinguishable from
precedent. In earlier cases, the Court affirmed Congress’s ability to
use broad language to set standards in legislation.254 In this instance,
the Court failed to provide any such standard, but instead essentially
allowed the regulatory entity to set its own standard, which under the
legislation, will be binding. This is made clear by separating subsection 2713(a)(4) into the three factors comprising an intelligible principle: (1) the general policy; (2) the entity that will apply the policy;
and (3) the boundaries of the delegated authority.255
The intent of the legislation is clear: cost sharing requirements
shall not be imposed for any additional preventative care and screenings for women that are not described in earlier sections and are provided for in the new comprehensive guidelines.256 Unlike other cases, however, this is not a delegation of discretion in applying a broad
250

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
252
See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
253
See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta).
254
See cases cited supra note 72.
255
See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
256
The legislation reads in relevant part:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage
for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirement . . . with respect to
women, such additional preventative care and screenings not described
in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported
by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of
this paragraph.
PPACA, supra note 5.
251
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standard, but rather delegation of discretion to determine the standard. The general policy of the delegation is to prevent women from
having to pay for particular preventative care and screenings. The
entity responsible for applying this standard is the Department of
Health and Human Services.257 The boundaries of the delegated authority, however, are not clear. The legislation explains that the services covered are those that are to be found in the “comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.”258 This language means
that there is no boundary established for the HRSA. Whereas the
other subsections in Section 2713 have predetermined standards to
apply, subsection four not only grants the authority to HRSA to determine new guidelines, but instructs the agency to establish such
guidelines within the bounds of the very paragraph granting it the authority to create the guidelines—essentially a carte blanche delegation of legislative authority to determine the standards.
The delegation to the HRSA is “unconfined and vagrant,”259
as there are no boundaries to limit the promulgation of whatever
standards the HRSA determines to be fitting without approval from
Congress.260 In Schechter, the Court found that a section of the
NIRA allowing the President to “approve a code or codes”261 was ultimately too unrestrictive and unconfined.262 As in the instant case,
which thus is distinguishable from Whitman and Mistretta, the Court
in Schechter struck down legislation that “[i]nstead of prescribing
rules of conduct . . . authorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe
them.”263
When an agency is granted the task, in legislation, to create
and provide the guidelines for enforcing the very same legislation
granting the agency legislative discretion, there should be a clear indication of the bounds of such power. Even if the delegation was determined to be one of discretion and not legislative authority, it is
257
The Health Resources and Services Administration is an agency of the Department of
Health and Human Services. See About HRSA, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
258
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (emphasis added).
259
See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (referencing Hot Oil).
260
Id.
261
Id. at 521 n.4 (majority opinion).
262
Id. at 541-42.
263
Id. at 541.
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problematic when the agency wields discretion to implement and enforce the very guidelines it was granted discretion to create. As such,
there has not only been a lack of guidance and boundaries from Congress regarding the creation of guidelines, but there is a total absence
of guidance from Congress on the appropriate application of such
guidelines.
This lack of guidance and total delegation of authority is
made evident by the frequent proliferation of amendments to the
code.264 Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that after
hearing comments regarding February 2013’s proposed alterations,
the Department of Health and Human Services will decide not to implement the expanded exemption and accommodation for other eligible non-exempt, non-profit organizations. Truthfully, this is an argument belying great skepticism; however, there is substantial
evidence in the previous interim rule and final rule papers that suggests that the Department of Health and Human Services has greatly
downplayed the disapproval of the rule commenters.265 In each of the
papers, the author spends nearly equal space discussing the arguments for and against the proposals,266 yet has clearly had to retreat
from its initial strict application of the rule.267
Assuming arguendo that the Court is to find an intelligible
principle and uphold the delegation on the basis of precedent, the
next issue is whether the language of Title 45, Section 147.130 is
within the boundary set by Congress in the legislation.268 If the Court
does indeed find an intelligible principle and deems the delegation
legitimate, it will likely find that the religious exemption is also within the boundary set by the legislation. In allowing such a broad delegation of legislative authority to conduct fact finding and determine
264

See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans, supra note 27 (introducing the preventative care language for 45 C.F.R. 247.130); see Group Health Plans II, supra note 30 (introducing the religious employer exemption); see Group Health Plans I, supra note 26 (adopting the religious employer exemption and providing the temporary enforcement “safe
harbor”); see Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25 (introducing proposal
of creating 45 CFR 247.131 to replace 45 C.F.R. 147.130(a)(1)(iv), as well as expand the
exemption and establish accommodations for other eligible organizations such as religious
schools, colleges, and universities with religious based objections to coverage of contraceptive services).
265
See Group Health Plans II, supra note 30, at 46, 623.
266
See Group Health Plans II, supra note 30; see Group Health Plans I, supra note 26.
267
See Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25.
268
See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
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what should be included in comprehensive guidelines concerning
preventative care and screening for women, it would be unlikely for
the Court to find any policy resulting from the application of the
agency’s guidelines to be outside the scope of the delegation.
If the Court adheres to its precedent of deference to Congress’s delegation of power to Executive agencies, despite the distinguishable nature of this case, it will likely find that the language of
PPACA Section 1001(5) is a legitimate delegation, and will thus uphold the constitutionality of the narrow religious exemption language.
In holding so, the Court would therefore reject the Nondelegation
Doctrine that this Comment champions and instead opt to accept the
more modern and deferential delegation position.
ii.

The Free Exercise Issue

The Supreme Court may find that the legislation and resulting
Federal Code could survive judicial scrutiny under a nondelegation
claim. However, the real issue debated in the lower courts today is
whether the contraceptive mandate should be upheld, regardless of
whether it is a product of improper delegation.269 The difficulty in
addressing the constitutional validity of the regulation is that most of
the decisions handed down by the courts have been rulings on procedure, such as ripeness and standing.270 Currently there is a split
among the Circuits regarding the appropriateness of injunctive relief
on the merits.271 The split is further exacerbated by the lack of a
269
As of the writing of this Comment, there are forty-eight cases before District and Circuit Courts across the United States. HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2013).
270
See id. Most of the difficulty surrounding these lawsuits is the result of the agency’s
ability to publish final rules and then proceed to further amend the final rules. Some courts
have held off on handing down final decisions in order to see the further actions of the agencies.
271
As it currently stands, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have both issued injunctions in
favor of the plaintiff. O’Brien v. US Dep’t of HHS, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012),
available at http://c0391070.cdn2.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/pdf/8th-circuit-ordergranting-temporary-injunction-in-obrien-v-hhs.pdf; Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012
WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Grote v. Sebelius, No. 13-1077, 2013 WL 362725
(7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013); Annex Medical v. Sebelius, No. 13-118 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013),
available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/8thCircuitAnnex.pdf.
The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have conversely denied injunctive relief. Hobby Lobby, Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012), reh’g en
banc granted, (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2013); Autocam Corp., v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673 (6th Cir.
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unanimous decision of the Circuit Judges, with the exception of one
case in the Eighth Circuit and one case in the Tenth Circuit.272 Not
only do the Circuit splits seem to destine the issue to reach the Supreme Court, but the Court itself also illustrated an interest in hearing
the case when it ordered the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to rehear some arguments after a premature dismissal following National
Federal of Independent Business v. Sebelius.273
RFRA provides that in order for a law burdening an individual’s right to free exercise to be deemed constitutional, the federal
government must demonstrate that the burden acts to further a compelling governmental interest and that such a burden is the least restrictive means of furthering the asserted governmental interest.274
Accordingly, looking at the arguments presented by both parties in
the cases that have reached the Circuit Courts, the explanations of the
government’s compelling interest and the plaintiffs’ burdens should
become clear.275
In rebutting a free exercise claim under RFRA, the Government must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in implementing the contraceptive coverage mandate. Of particular concern, the government will have to illustrate the compelling
governmental interest in the mandatory coverage of contraceptive
services without imposition of cost sharing requirements by all nonexempt276 group health plans or group/individual health insurance
Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/orderdenying-injunctionAutocam-CA6.pdf; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., v. Sect’y of the
US Dep’t of HHS, No. 13-1144 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Conestoga-CTA-Order-DenyingInjunction.pdf.
272
See generally Annex Medical, No. 13-118; Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302.
273
See SCOTUS Orders Appeals Court to Hear Liberty University Health Care Lawsuit,
POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84226.html (last updated Nov.
27, 2012). See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566.
274
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
275
This Comment will regard these cases strictly for the arguments presented when the
courts determined whether the plaintiff’s arguments possessed any merit. See Korte, 2012
WL 6757353, at *2 (requiring “some likelihood of success on the merits”); Hobby Lobby,
2012 WL 6930302, at *1 (requiring “substantial likelihood of success on the merits”);
Autocam, No. 12-2673, at 1 (requiring a strong likelihood of success on the merits”); Conestoga, No. 13-1144, at 2 (requiring “a likelihood of success on the merits”). This note serves
as recognition that all of the Circuit Court decisions discussed were appeals for injunctive
relief and thus are not necessarily indicative of how the courts would rule on the merits.
276
Assuming that 78 FR 8456 has effectively removed religiously affiliated organizations
from the mandate, the RFRA discussion will proceed focusing upon the burden on the reli-
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coverage plans.277 Several executive offices and associated individuals have argued that the compelling governmental interest is in promoting public health, ensuring access to the recommended preventative services, and ensuring that the decision whether to use
contraception and in what form is a decision for the woman to make,
rather than the employer.278
This argument is supported by the data upon which the HRSA
relied when making the guidelines, most notably the study on preventative services for women published by the Institute of Medicine’s
Committee on Preventative Services for Women.279 In that study, the
Committee made the recommendation that women’s preventative
services include “the full range of Food and Drug Administrationapproved contraception methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.”280
This recommendation was used by the HRSA in its comprehensive
guideline for “contraceptive methods and counseling.”281 Moreover,
the study put forth several arguments to support the inclusion of contraception under the umbrella of women’s preventative care, including a decrease in unintended pregnancies and the treatment of “menstrual disorders, acne, hirsutism, and pelvic pain.”282 The study’s
primary focus was on the unintended pregnancies, the costs of such
pregnancies, and the effect on the mothers.283 Furthermore, the study
found that the most effective and long lasting contraceptive methods
are typically out of the reach of women due to high costs284 or their
gious rights of the remaining for-profit organizations with religious objections to the mandate.
277
See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130.
278
See Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *4; see also Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay
Carney, 1/31/12, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/01/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112). Since the promotion of
public health is such a broad interest, and the contraceptive mandate has a particular focus on
ensuring and increasing the availability of contraceptive services, the accepted compelling
governmental interest for the sake of this comment is primarily on the interest of ensuring
and increasing availability of contraceptive services for women.
279
CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (Committee on
Preventative Services for Women, Inst. of Med., 2011) [hereinafter CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE
SERVICES].
280
Id. at 110.
281
HRSA Guidelines, supra note 22.
282
CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES, supra note 279, at 104, 107.
283
Id. at 102-04.
284
Id. at 108.
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socio-economic background.285
While the Government may have a legitimate compelling interest in ensuring and increasing women’s access to contraceptive
services, it is not entirely clear that the Government has sufficiently
supported this interest. Directly following the Federal Code provision dictating the necessary coverage of contraceptive services is a
section dealing with determination of the “preservation of right to
maintain existing coverage.”286 This section of the code sets forth
standards dealing with grandfathered health plan coverage, which the
text defines as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or individual health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on
March 23, 2010 (for as long as it maintains that status under the rules
of this section).”287 The regulation exempts any such grandfathered
coverage from the application of Title I(A) or Title I(C) of the
PPACA.288 Interestingly enough, Title I(A) of the PPACA includes
Section 1001 of the bill, which provides for the modification and alteration of Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act dealing
with preventative services.289
A legitimate argument can be made that by establishing such
a sweeping initial exemption, the Government cannot legitimately
claim that it has a compelling governmental interest in ensuring and
increasing women’s access to contraceptive services or that the mandate furthers such an interest. Not only does Section 147.140 allow
grandfathered plans to avoid having to cover contraceptive services,
but it also allows plans that already cover contraceptive services to
maintain a co-pay for services and even increase “fixed-amount copayments,” provided the increase is less than “$5 times medical inflation, plus $5”290 or a maximum percentage increase “determined by
expressing the total increase in the copayment as a percentage.”291
The legitimacy of the Government’s argument that the purpose of the
contraception mandate is to ensure women’s ready and affordable access to contraception is clearly eroded by the other language promul-

285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Id. at 102.
45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2011).
Id. at § 147.140(a)(1)(i).
Id. at § 147.140(c)(1).
See Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title I.
45 C.F.R. §147.140(g)(1)(iv)(A).
Id. at §147.150(g)(1)(iv)(B).
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gated by the very same corpus of regulation.292
Assuming arguendo that the Court does indeed find the Government’s proposed governmental interest compelling and that the
mandate furthers such an interest, the next issue would be whether
the regulation is the least restrictive means of ensuring and increasing
women’s access to contraceptive services. The strongest argument
the Government might present is that because the corporation pays
for the health coverage, there is no dirtying of the hands or commission of sin by the corporate owners.293 As such, the Government will
most likely appeal to earlier decisions that it will claim deny corporations the right to sue under the RFRA because “ ‘the “historic function” of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals.’ ”294 Accordingly, the Government might argue, and has
argued, that the mandate is the least restrictive means of ensuring and
increasing women’s access to contraceptive services because the burdened entities cannot assert such a deprivation of rights under the
First Amendment. This is due to the fact that free exercise is a purely
personal right.295
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,296 the Court declined to “address the abstract question whether corporations have the
full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.”297 As such, the Government’s assertion that corporations cannot claim the benefits of a “purely personal” protection is not as ironclad as the district court in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius
(“Hobby Lobby I”)298 would make it out to be.299 Regardless of this,
several district courts and some circuit courts, including the Tenth
292
This conclusion equally applies to the unaddressed compelling governmental interest
regarding the promotion of public health. To exempt a broad range of programs from application from the very beginning does nothing to further promote public health.
293
See Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (explaining that “[s]uch an indirect and
attenuated relationship appears unlikely to establish the necessary ‘substantial burden’ ”);
see also Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (Rovener, J., dissenting) (explaining that the corporate form “does separate the Kortes, in some real measure, from the actions of their company”).
294
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius (Hobby Lobby I), 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 128788 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14
(1978) (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944))).
295
Id. at 1287.
296
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
297
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
298
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
299
See id. at 1288.
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Circuit in Hobby Lobby I, have recognized a growing trend of courts
enforcing RFRA to protect the individual rights of plaintiffs to participate or abstain from specific practices required or prohibited by their
religion.300 Several courts dealing with requests for injunctive relief
on this particular issue have allowed the corporate owners as individual plaintiffs to have standing under RFRA.301 In one case in particular, the court highlighted the plaintiffs’ argument that “ ‘[t]here is no
business or corporation “exception” ‘ to RFRA or the Free Exercise
Clause, and that these provisions protect the religious exercise of any
entity . . . .”302
Further arguments can be made in opposition to the Government’s claim that there is no burden on the individual business owner
because of the indirect nature of the purchase of coverage. In particular, the Government’s argument fails to consider the nature of
corporate governance. The dissenting judge in Conestoga presented
the plaintiffs’ dilemma as: “[M]ake us pay for something poisonous
to our religious beliefs or face the destruction of our business.”303
Does the corporate structure cause such a separation between the acts
of the corporation and the owners that the government can impose
such a choice upon the owners, but at the same time allow for the
piercing of the corporate veil for corporate debts? This argument also raises the question whether partnerships or other business entities
are left uncovered under RFRA. Additional concerns must be addressed regarding how well the mandate ensures and increases public
health or women’s access to contraceptive services for companies
with less than fifty employees.304 If an employer with fewer than fifty employees chooses to help provide health insurance for his or her
employees, but finds the mandatory coverage of contraceptive services morally repugnant, he or she may instead decide not to provide
insurance for the employees, as was the case in Annex Medical Inc.,

300

See Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3.
See Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3; see Annex Med. Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 13-118;
see Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at
*5-*9 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012).
302
Tyndale, 2012 WL 5817323, at *5.
303
Conestoga, No. 13-1144, at 12 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
304
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H) (2006) (establishing minimum requirements of employersponsored plans for “large employers”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (defining
“large corporations” as employing fifty or more individuals).
301
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et al. v. Sebelius, et al.305 In situations dealing with small business, it
is difficult to see how the compelling interest proffered by the government is furthered. Even greater constitutional issues arise due to
the exemption of some corporations and not others, which creates an
equal protection classification scheme that raises additional issues
beyond the scope of this Comment.
Despite the Government’s assertion that the contraception
mandate in its current form is the least restrictive means of furthering
its compelling governmental interest, there are several alternative
methods through which the same goal could be achieved. According
to one author who found the religious exemption of Title 45, Section
142.130 to be constitutional under RFRA, “[t]he least restrictive
means requirement must . . . mean that the Act could have gone further to protect the specific free exercise interests claimed by those
challenging the Act.”306 The author established this meaning after
stating that an Act cannot fail under RFRA simply for not including
each and every exemption the plaintiff could think of.307 While this
is true, it does not change the fact that in crafting the contraception
mandate, Congress and the executive agencies could have chosen a
series of alternatives to achieve the same goals.
In Korte, et al. v. Sebelius, et al.,308 the Seventh Circuit discussed, albeit very briefly, one such alternative posed by the plaintiffs
illustrating that the contraceptive mandate as it is written is not the
least restrictive means. Although it is only a quick aside, the court
took notice of the plaintiff’s proposal that the government offer tax
deductions or credits for the purchase of plans covering contraception.309 Such a concept has tremendous potential to encourage corporations and individual employers, which would otherwise not fall under the religious exemption, to purchase insurance plans with
contraception services. Furthermore, this option would allow corporations and employers to retain autonomy in making decisions
whether to cover the cost of employee health care.
In addition, a number of state programs could include the
305

Annex Med. Inc., No. 13-118, at 3.
Samuel T. Grover, Religious Exemptions to the PPACA’s Health Insurance Mandate,
37 AM. J. L. & MED. 624, 644 (2011).
307
Grover, supra note 306, at 644.
308
Korte, 2012 WL 6757353.
309
Id. at *3.
306
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mandated coverage instead of all private insurance programs. Under
services such as Medicaid, COBRA, and other state run health coverage programs,310 a rider could be offered that would extend coverage
of contraceptive services or could create new programs altogether.
Such programs would likely be funded by general taxes, and any religiously objecting plaintiff would have a difficult time establishing a
sufficient claim against such taxes because of the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Lee.311 In Lee, the Court held that if religious denominations were allowed to challenge a general tax, such as
income tax or the tax enacted by the Social Security Act, premised
solely on the assumption that the taxes may be spent in a manner violative of that sect’s beliefs, the tax system could not function.312
Lastly, an alternative to the mandate could have been a tax
deduction for all women working under employers who found the
purchasing of coverage including contraceptive services to be contrary to their religious beliefs. One of the concerns arising out of the report from the Institute of Medicine was the cost of contraceptive services, especially among certain demographics.313 In providing these
deductions, the government would relieve the burden placed on the
rights of religious employers as well as the financial hardship placed
on the women employees.
VI.

CONCLUSION

At the end of Federalist 48, Madison noted with concern that
“a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the
several departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of
government in the same hands.”314 Justice Thomas raised this very
same concern in Whitman when he observed that the plaintiffs had
failed to raise the argument most obviously available to them—the
granting of all legislative power to Congress in Article I, Section 1 of

310
Approximately half the states in the Union already operate Medicaid-founded programs focusing on family planning and contraceptive services. CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE
SERVICES, supra note 279, at 108.
311
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
312
Id. at 260.
313
CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES, supra note 279, at 108.
314
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the Constitution.315
The constant delegation of discretion and the more disturbing
delegation of legislative authority from the legislature to the executive is something that should be carefully noted and skeptically observed by all citizens of the United States. It has become clear that
the Supreme Court is hesitant to declare such delegations unconstitutional or unlawfully broad,316 just as the Court has also come to deem
the oppression of religious minorities to be an “unavoidable consequence of democratic governments.”317
Results of recent legislation such as the contraceptive services
coverage mandate arising out of the PPACA have finally awakened a
sleeping public to the grave threat that such delegation poses to
American liberties. To combat this threat, a plaintiff should
acknowledge the wisdom of Justice Thomas and invoke Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution as one of several very strong arguments
against this abuse.

315
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”).
316
See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75.
317
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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